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Abstract—As the prices of magnetic storage continue to
decrease, the cost of replacing failed disks becomes
increasingly dominated by the cost of the service call itself. We
propose to eliminate these calls by building disk arrays that
contain enough spare disks to operate without any human
intervention during their whole lifetime. To evaluate the
feasibility of this approach, we have simulated the behavior of
two-dimensional disk arrays with n parity disks and n(n – 1)/2
data disks under realistic failure and repair assumptions. Our
conclusion is that having n(n + 1)/2 spare disks is more than
enough to achieve a 99.999 percent probability of not losing
data over four years. We observe that the same objectives
cannot be reached with RAID level 6 organizations and would
require RAID stripes that could tolerate triple disk failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite recent advances in solid-state storage
technologies, magnetic disks remain the most cost-effective
solution for storing large amounts of data. As a result, most
of today’s large data centers store the vast majority of their
data on magnetic disks. One of the main issues these centers
have to face is protecting their data against potential losses
caused by disk failures. All extant solutions involve a
combination of maintaining enough redundant information
to be able to reconstitute the contents of failed drives and
promptly regenerating the contents of these drives on new
ones.
These solutions are not difficult to implement in
installations that have trained personnel on site round-the-
clock. When this is not the case, disk repairs will have to
wait until a technician can service the failed disk. There are
two major disadvantages to this solution. First, it introduces
an additional delay, which will have a detrimental effect on
the reliability of the storage system. Second, the cost of the
service call is likely to exceed that of the equipment being
replaced. This is even truer for installations that are far away
from metropolitan areas. Batching repairs is not an option
because it would have a strong negative impact on the
reliability of the array.
We present another solution. Self-repairing disk arrays
are disk arrays that contain enough spare disks to free users
from all maintenance tasks over the expected lifetime of
each array [14, 15]. Human intervention will only be needed
if the observed disk failure rates significantly exceed 4 to 5
percent per year. This would be the case if the installed
disks happened to belong to a bad batch. The solution would
be to replace the defective array with a new one.
Three challenges are to be met to make these
organizations cost-effective. These are the initial cost of the
array, its performance and its long-term reliability. The
results we present here show that we can build disk arrays
that can achieve 99.999 percent reliability over four years
with a space overhead not exceeding that of mirroring. Our
model assigns equal failure rates to both active drives and
spare drives, and assumes that these rates will follow a
bathtub curve with high failure rates for the first eighteen
months, much lower failure rates for the next eighteen
months and much higher failure rates after that.
The main lesson we learned from our study is the
importance of starting with a highly reliable disk array
organization. Unlike conventional disk arrays, self-repairing
arrays can run out of spares. While this risk can be managed,
eliminating it would require a disproportionate number of
spares. As a result, self-repairing disk arrays require
additional redundancy to compensate for this new risk.
Our study also illustrated the benefits of repairing failed
disks as fast as possible. Disk repairs in conventional fault-
tolerant arrays can be delayed by many factors, among
which are the lack of spares and the need to bring in a
technician. During this time interval, the array remains less
protected or even completely unprotected against additional
disk failures or irrecoverable read errors. Self-repairing disk
arrays include their own spares and are not subject to these
delays.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II reviews previous work on fault-tolerant disk
arrays. Section III introduces self-repairing disk arrays and
presents the results of our simulation study. Finally, Section
IV has our conclusions.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Sparing is a well-known technique for increasing the
reliability of disk arrays. Adding a spare disk to an array
provides the replacement disk for the first failure.
Distributed sparing [24] gains performance benefits in the
initial state and degrades to normal performance after the
first disk failure.
RAID arrays were the first disk array organizations to
utilize erasure coding in order to protect data against disk
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Fig. 1. A two-dimensional RAID organization using four parity disks (P1 to
P4) to protect the contents of six data disks (D12 to D34) against all double
disk failures.
failures [4, 7, 16, 21]. While RAID levels 3, 4 and 5 only
tolerate single disk failures, RAID level 6 organizations
use (n – 2)-out-of-n codes to protect data against double disk
failures [3]. EvenOdd, Row-Diagonal Parity and the
Liberation Codes are three RAID level 6 organizations that
use only XOR operations to construct their parity informa-
tion [2, 4, 6, 18, 19]. Huang and Xu proposed a coding
scheme correcting triple failures [9].
Two-dimensional RAID arrays, or 2D-Parity arrays,
were first investigated by Schwarz [22] and Hellerstein et al.
[8]. More recently, Lee patented a two-dimensional disk
array organization with prompt parity updates in one
dimension and delayed parity updates in the second
dimension [11]. Since these arrays store their parity
information on dedicated disks, they are better suited for
archival storage than maintaining more dynamic workloads.
Complete two-dimensional RAID arrays consist of n
parity stripes, each containing a single parity disk. We
assume that all these stripes intersect with each other and
that any two arbitrary stripes intersect at exactly one single
point. We then place one data disk at each of these
intersections for a total of n(n – 1)/2 data disks [12, 23].
Fig. 1 represents a two-dimensional RAID array with
four parity disks (P1 to P4) and six data disks (D12 to D34) for
a total of ten disks. More generally, a complete two-
dimensional array with n parity disks will comprise
n(n + 1)/2 data disks and its space overhead will be 2/(n + 1).
The main interest of this organization is its high
reliability. Since each data disk belongs to two distinct
parity stripes, it can tolerate the failures of two arbitrary
disks. As Fig. 2 shows, the sole triple failures that can result
in a data loss are:
1. The failure of a data disk and its two parity disks
2. The failure of three data disks at the intersection
In addition, it has been recently shown that these arrays
tolerated most quadruple and quintuple failures [23].
III. SELF-REPAIRING DISK ARRAYS
Our main objective is to achieve 99.999 percent
reliability over a five-year interval while keeping both the
space overhead and the update overhead as low as possible.
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Fig. 2. Examples of fatal triple failures.
A. Lessons from a previous attempt
In a first attempt [14], we chose three-dimensional
RAID arrays [13] as our base organization because of their
high reliability and their low space overhead, selected a
five-year disk array lifetime and assumed disk failures were
independent events distributed according to a Poisson law
with a mean time to failure (MTTF) of 100,000 hours. This
value is at the low end of the values observed by both
Schroeder and Gibson [20], and Pinheiro, Weber and
Barroso [17] and seemed to be a good conservative estimate.
Disk repairs were assumed to take 12 hours.
Our simulation results indicated that the feasibility of
our design depended on the failure rate of unused spare
disks. As long as these rates remains negligible, zero
maintenance disk arrays with at least 77 disks can provide a
five-year reliability of 99.999 percent with a space overhead
comparable to that of mirroring. If this is not the case, space
overheads would be much higher.
We now believe these conclusions were the result of
several questionable choices:
1. Assuming a disk MTTF of 100,000 hours was an
overly pessimistic choice. This value corresponds
to a yearly failure rate of 8.76 percent, which is
much higher than the average failure rates observed
by as both Schroeder and Gibson, and Pinheiro,
Weber and Barroso.
2. Selecting a five-year array lifetime did not take
into account that SATA drives tend to start wearing
out after three years.
3. As disk capacities have increased at faster rates
than their transfer bandwidth, reconstructing the
contents of a failed disk on a spare will typically
take more than 12 hours.
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Fig. 3. Disk failure rates reported by Beach [1]
B. Our new model
We incorporated in our new model the conclusions of a
recent study by Beach [1] reporting on the disk failure rates
of more than 25,000 disks at Backblaze. He mentioned that
Backblaze disks tend to fail at a rate of 5.1 percent per year
during their first eighteen months, then at the much lower
rate of 1.4 percent per year during the next eighteen months,
and at the much higher rate of 11.8 percent per year after
that. Fig. 3 summarizes these data. In our new model:
1. We assume that disks will fail at a rate of 5.1
percent per year during their first 18 months, then
at 1.4 percent per year during the next 18 months,
and at 11.8 percent per year after that.
2. We assume that spare disks that are yet unused fail
at the same rate as the other disks, which is a very
pessimistic assumption. In reality, we should
expect these spare disks to fail at significantly
lower than these of operational disks but have no
way to estimate by how much.
3. We assume that the disk array will remain
operational for four years instead of five.
4. We assume that disk repairs will take 24 hours
instead of 12 hours. Assuming a disk transfer rate
of 200 MB/s, this repair time suffices for
rebuilding the entire contents of a 4TB disk while
using less than 25 percent of the available disk
bandwidth.
In addition we selected complete two-dimensional RAID
arrays as our base configuration because they have lower
update costs than three-dimensional RAID arrays.
C. The simulation study
We conducted our simulation study using the Proteus
discrete simulation program [10]. Proteus characterizes each
storage array by five numbers, namely the size n of the array,
the number nf of simultaneous disk failures the array will
always tolerate without data loss, and the respective fractions
f1, f2 and f3 of simultaneous failures of nf + 1, nf + 2 and nf + 3
disks that will not result in a data loss. The program is
written in Python 3 and uses a fairly standard event-driven
approach.
TABLE I. FOUR-YEAR SURVIVAL RATES AND SPACE OVERHEADS OF
SELECTED TWO-DIMENSIONAL SELF-REPAIRING DISK ARRAYS.
Number of Space
Overhead
Ninety-five percent
C I for
four-year reliability
Data
disks
Parity
disks
Spare
disks
21 7 19 55.32% (4.99, 5.05)
21 7 20 56.25% (5.17, 5.25)
28 8 23 52.54% (5.00, 5.06)
28 8 24 53.33% (5.12, 5.20)
36 9 27 50.00% (4.89, 4.94)
36 9 28 50.68% (5.03, 5.09)
45 10 33 48.86% (4.98, 5.04)
45 10 34 49.44% (5.07, 5.13)
55 11 53 53.78% (4.98, 5.04)
55 11 54 54.17% (5.00, 5.06)
66 12 ∞ ∞ (4.79, 4.84)
The program was slightly modified in order to handle
spare disk failures differently from other disk failures and
implement variable failure rates.
C. The simulation study
Table I summarizes our results. In the rightmost column,
ninety-five percent confidence intervals for the four-year
disk array reliability are expressed in “nines,” using the
formula ),1(log10 dn Rn −−= where nn is the number of nines
and Rd is the four-year reliability of the array. Thus a
reliability of 99.9 percent would be represented by three
nines, a reliability of 99.99 percent by four nines, and so on.
As we can see, the lowest space overheads are obtained
with a configuration consisting of 45 data disks, 10 parity
disks and 33 or 34 spare disks. Conversely both smaller and
larger array configurations require more space overhead to
achieve five nine reliability over four years. In addition, the
largest configuration cannot achieve five nines even with an
unlimited number of spares.
To understand that, we need to understand that self-
repairing arrays can fail for two different reasons. Like all
fault-tolerant disk arrays, they can fail because a rapid
succession of disk failures defeats the array recovery
processes. In addition, they can run out of spares.
Recall that a complete two-dimensional RAID array
with n parity disks has n(n – 1)/2 data disks. Hence the
parity-disk-to-data-disk ratio of any array is 2/(n – 1), which
is a decreasing function of the size of the array. As smaller
arrays have a higher parity-disk-to-data-disk ratio than
larger arrays, they are inherently more reliable. Hence most
data losses will occur when the array runs out of spares. The
central limit theorem predicts that the coefficient of
variation of the number of disk failures that will occur over
a four-year interval will decrease proportionally to the
square root of the size of the array. This means that
guaranteeing a better than five nine probability of not
running out of spares will require a much larger safety
margin than for larger arrays.
Conversely, larger arrays have smaller parity-disk-to-
data-disk ratios and are inherently less reliable. Obtaining
five nines with a 66 disk array will thus require an ample
TABLE II. FOUR-YEAR SURVIVAL RATES AND SPACE OVERHEADS OF
SELECTED SETS OF RAID LEVEL 6 ARRAYS WITH 12 DISKS EACH.
Number of Space
Overhead
Ninety-five percent
C I for
four-year reliability
Data
“disks”
Parity
“disks”
Spare
disks
10 2 18 66.67% (5.02, 5.09)
20 4 ∞ ∞ (4.48, 4.84)
30 6 ∞ ∞ (4.35, 4.64)
40 8 ∞ ∞ (4.33, 4.63)
supply of spares: Consider for instance the array
configuration with 55 data disks, 11 parity disks and 54
spares in the next-to-last line of Table I. We observed 746
data losses in 80 million runs and noted that the array only
ran out of spares two times during that time. Even larger
arrays are inherently even less reliable. As Table I shows, an
array with 66 data disks and 12 parity disks will never be
able to achieve five nines over four years, even when
provided with an unlimited supply of spares.
C. Application to RAID level 6 arrays.
We wanted to see if we could build self-repairing disk
arrays by grouping together a few RAID level 6 arrays. A
typical RAID level 6 array does not have separate data and
parity disks. Each of its disks contains both data and parity
blocks. The well-known advantage of the approach is a
better update bandwidth as parity updates are spread among
all the disks.
Consider a set of m identical RAID level 6 arrays with
n disks each for a total of m×n disks. Since each RAID level
6 array will contain the equivalent of two parity disks, its
parity overhead will be 2/n. The probability that a triple disk
failure will result in a data loss is the probability that all
three failures occur in the same array:
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The probability that a quadruple disk failure will result
in a data loss is the probability that all four failures occur in
the same array plus the probability that three of the four
failures occur in the same array times the probability that
the fourth failure occurs in one of the m – 1 remaining
arrays:
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The probability that a quintuple disk failure will result
in a data loss is the probability that that all five failures
occur in the same array plus the probability that four of the
five failures occur in the same array times the probability
that the fifth failure occurs one of the m – 1 remaining
arrays plus the probability that three of the five failures
occur in the same array times the probability that the two
other failures occur in the m – 1 remaining arrays:
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Using the same techniques as before, we simulated the
performance over four year of self-repairing disk arrays
consisting of one to four RAID level 6 arrays with 12 disks
each. We selected that value because it happens to be a
fairly popular choice for RAID level 6 due to its reasonable
space overhead (2/12 = 16.7 percent).
Table II summarizes our rather disappointing results.
The only configuration that could achieve five nines over
four years was a single RAID array with 12 disks and it
required 18 spares. Larger configurations could not achieve
five nines even with an unlimited number of spares.
One obvious choice would be to lower our requirements
and decide that four nines over four years would be enough.
Another option would be to replace the constituting RAID
level 6 arrays by arrays tolerating triple failures.
Consider, for instance, a set of m identical RAID arrays
tolerating triple failures. In order to be able to tolerate all
triple failures, each array will have to contain the equivalent
of three parity disks. The probability that a quadruple disk
failure will result in a data loss is the probability that all four
failures occur in the same array:
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The probability that a quintuple disk failure will result
in a data loss is the probability that all five failures occur in
the same array plus the probability that four of the five
failures occur in the same array times the probability that
the fifth failure occurs in one of the m – 1 remaining arrays:
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The probability that a sextuple disk failure will result in a
data loss is the probability that that all six failures occur in
the same array plus the probability that five of the six
failures occur in the same array times the probability that
the sixth failure occurs in one of the m – 1 remaining arrays
plus the probability that four of the six failures occur in the
same array times the probability that the two other failures
occur in the m – 1 remaining arrays:
TABLE III. FOUR-YEAR SURVIVAL RATES AND SPACE OVERHEADS OF
SELECTED SETS OF RAID ARRAYS WITH 15 DISKS EACH AND TRIPLE PARITY.
Number of Space
Overhead
Ninety-five percent
C I for
four-year reliability
Data
“disks”
Parity
“disks”
Spare
disks
12 3 13 57.14% (4.98, 5.17)
12 3 14 58.62% (5.36, 5.66)
24 6 20 52.00% (4.90, 5.19)
36 9 26 49.30% (4.98, 5.30)
36 9 27 50.00% (5.23, 5.97)
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Table III displays our results. We assumed that each
RAID with triple parity consisted of 15 disks. Since each of
these arrays contains the equivalent of three parity disks, its
parity overhead is 3/15, that is, 20 percent. As we can see,
the new organization can achieve five-nine reliability over
four years with a space overhead comparable to that of
mirroring. As we observed before, the very small
configurations have a significantly higher space overhead
than the bigger ones.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have proposed to reduce the maintenance cost of
disks arrays by building self-repairing arrays that contain
enough spare disks to operate without any human
intervention during their whole lifetime. To illustrate the
feasibility of our approach, we have shown that several
complete two-dimensional disk arrays with n parity disks,
n(n – 1)/2 data disks, and less than n(n + 1)/2 data disks
could achieve a 99.999 percent probability of not losing data
over four years. We also noted that the same objectives
cannot be reached with self-repairing arrays consisting of
RAID level 6 parity stripes and would require RAID stripes
capable of tolerating three disk failures.
More work is still needed to define policies that would
allow array users and manufacturers to detect unusually disk
failure rates and take the appropriate actions before any data
loss takes place.
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